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FAKE NEWS: POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE 
ONLINE EPIDEMIC* 
On December 4, 2016, police arrested Edgar Maddison Welch 
for assault with a dangerous weapon at Comet Ping Pong pizzeria in 
Washington, D.C.1 At some point before that day, Welch came across 
a story, transmitted online through 4chan, Reddit, and Twitter, along 
with other websites,2 stating that Hillary and Bill Clinton used Comet 
Ping Pong as a “front for a pedophile sex ring; the back room was 
supposedly used for kidnapping and trafficking children.”3 Welch 
accepted this story as true and decided he had to put a stop to it.4 He 
grabbed his assault rifle and drove 360 miles from his home in 
Salisbury, North Carolina to Comet Ping Pong in Washington, D.C,5 
operated by the Clinton’s “co-conspirators,” to end the supposed 
scheme himself.6 He entered the store with family patrons present, 
walked up to the counter, and pointed his assault rifle directly at the 
cashier’s face.7 No one was injured, and Welch was apprehended and 
arrested by Washington police outside the restaurant soon after the 
incident.8 
This “Pizzagate” conspiracy started when James Alefantis, 
Comet Ping Pong’s owner, was mentioned in an email sent from 
Hillary Clinton’s campaign manager because he was considering 
organizing a fundraiser for Clinton’s presidential campaign.9 
 
 *  © 2017 Lee K. Royster. 
 1. Kevin Bohn, Daniel Allman & Greg Clary, Gun-Brandishing Man Sought to 
Investigate Fake News Story Site, Police Say, CNN (Dec. 5, 2016, 2:48 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/04/politics/gun-incident-fake-news/ [https://perma.cc/4ECZ-PDE8]. 
 2. See Brian Stelter, Fake News, Real Violence: ‘Pizzagate’ and the Consequences of 
an Internet Echo Chamber, CNN (Dec. 6, 2016, 9:30 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/12
/05/media/fake-news-real-violence-pizzagate/ [https://perma.cc/UFM9-5J7C]. 
 3. Kate Samuelson, What to Know About Pizzagate, the Fake News Story with Real 
Consequences, TIME (Dec. 5, 2016), http://time.com/4590255/pizzagate-fake-news-what-to
-know/ [https://perma.cc/P6XX-7S74]. 
 4. See Bohn et al., supra note 1 (reporting that Welch told police officers he went to 
the pizza parlor to “self-investigate”). 
 5. Driving Directions from Salisbury, N.C., to Washington, D.C., GOOGLE MAPS, 
http://maps.google.com [https://perma.cc/CJ86-GBGA] (follow “Directions” hyperlink; 
then search starting point field for “Salisbury, NC,” and search destination field for 
“Washington, DC”). 
 6. Bohn, et al., supra note 1. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Samuelson, supra note 3. 
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Members of the anonymous message board 4chan combed through 
posts on Alefantis’s social media accounts and developed a pedophile 
sex-ring conspiracy theory that spread to other social media sites, 
including Twitter, Facebook, and a Reddit thread called “Pizzagate” 
with thousands of subscribers.10 Even before Welch’s extreme 
reaction to the fake news story, the business encountered frequent 
protests outside the restaurant, as well as harassment of Alefantis and 
his staff on their respective social media sites.11 
While the story of Welch’s planned assault on a pizzeria is 
extraordinary, it is not uncommon for people to believe fake stories 
as true.12 During the 2016 presidential race, “stories” with no basis in 
fact erupted around the world: “Pope Francis Shocks World, 
Endorses Donald Trump for President”;13 “RuPaul Claims Trump 
Touched Him Inappropriately in the 90s”;14 “WikiLeaks Confirms 
Hillary Sold Weapons to ISIS	.	.	.	Then Drops Another Bombshell.”15 
These stories are more than simply narratives containing factual 
errors. They are just a few examples of completely fabricated stories 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. It is unclear exactly how Welch first came across this story; however, it is notable 
that he followed Alex Jones and Infowars on Facebook, and Jones posted frequently 
about this story. Tim Mack, ‘Pizzagate’ Gunman Liked Alex Jones, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 4, 
2016, 10:16 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/pizzagate-gunman-liked-alex-jones 
[https://perma.cc/AZ5A-VU8Y]. The Infowars articles on the conspiracy theory fit the 
“fake news” definition presented in this Recent Development. See infra Part I. It is 
impossible to know whether Welch would have learned of and believed the Pizzagate 
story notwithstanding Jones and Infowars’ presentation of it as truthful, but the notice-
and-takedown remedy proposed in this Recent Development would have permitted 
Alefantis to force Infowars and other websites to remove the stories from their sites, or 
else face litigation. See infra Part IV. 
 13. Pope Francis Shocks World, Endorses Donald Trump for President, Releases 
Statement, WTOE5 NEWS, https://web.archive.org/web/20161115024211/http://wtoe5news.com
/us-election/pope-francis-shocks-world-endorses-donald-trump-for-president-releases-
statement/ [http://perma.cc/9PYA-ZQ7Q]; Hannah Ritchie, Read All About It: The 
Biggest Fake News Stories of 2016, CNBC.COM (Dec. 30, 2016, 2:04 AM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/12/30/read-all-about-it-the-biggest-fake-news-stories-of-2016.html 
[http://perma.cc/EQ7R-G5KC]. 
 14. Rupaul Claims Trump Touched Him Inappropriately in the 1990s, NEW WORLD 
ORDER MEDIA, http://worldnewsdailyreport.com/rupaul-claims-trump-touched-him-
inappropriately-in-the-1990s/ [http://perma.cc/8AXG-2YTK] (last visited Sept. 26, 2017). 
This website is explicitly a satire site; nonetheless, it was one of the top 20 performing 
election stories on Facebook in the final three months leading up to the 2016 election. 
Craig Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories 
Outperformed Real News on Facebook, BUZZFEED (Nov. 16, 2016, 4:15 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-outperformed-real-news-
on-facebook?utm_term=.cim087pOB#.xl9npN4Yw [http://perma.cc/7K8H-9VLW]. 
 15. Silverman, supra note 14. 
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that were shared and disseminated rampantly in 2016.16 Regardless of 
the target of fake news stories or the reasons for their contrivance, 
fake news stories clearly resonated with the public during the 2016 
election.17 According to a BuzzFeed report, false election-related 
stories had greater Facebook engagement than election stories 
generated by mainstream media outlets, such as The Washington Post 
and The New York Times.18 
Beyond the contention that fake news may have had some 
impact on the 2016 presidential election and that rampant 
misinformation is bad for society in general, fake news has a much 
more concrete and justiciable harm: reputational damage caused by 
the publication of a demonstrably false claim. For example, the 
“Pizzagate” story hurt the reputation of Comet Ping Pong, its owner, 
and staff, and the story inspired someone to bring a gun to a 
restaurant. At the same time, the story likely damaged Hillary 
Clinton’s reputation,19 both as an individual and as a presidential 
candidate, by suggesting that she was complicit in the kidnapping, 
imprisonment, and torture of children.20 While technology CEOs 
disagree as to whether the individual companies can or should 
regulate fake news stories,21 the legal system has the tools necessary 
 
 16. See id. (listing other 2016 election fake news stories, including allegations that 
Hillary Clinton’s emails were “worse than anyone could have imagined,” or that she was 
“already disqualified from holding any federal office”). 
 17. Fake News Expert on Why False Stories Spread and Why People Believe Them, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 14, 2016, 12:31 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/12/14/505547295
/fake-news-expert-on-how-false-stories-spread-and-why-people-believe-them [https://perma.cc
/E2MQ-AKN5] [hereinafter Fake News Expert]. 
 18. Silverman, supra note 14. 
 19. For more information on why Clinton and potential plaintiffs like her are unlikely 
to pursue recovery under traditional defamation law from websites, see infra notes 78–80 
and accompanying text. 
 20. See Joshua Gillin, How Pizzagate Went from Fake News to a Real Problem for a 
D.C. Business, POLITIFACT (Dec. 5, 2016, 5:23 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/article/2016/dec/05/how-pizzagate-went-fake-news-real-problem-dc-busin/ [http://perma.cc
/MB8S-VQ8S]. 
 21. Compare Lucinda Shen, Apple CEO Tim Cook Says ‘Fake News’ Must Be 
Tackled, FORTUNE (Feb. 10, 2017) http://fortune.com/2017/02/10/fake-news-apple-
facebook-tim-cook-google/ [https://perma.cc/3SQ8-R8V8] (“We have to give the 
consumer tools, to help with this. And we’ve got to filter out part of it before it ever gets 
there without losing the great openness of the internet . . . . This is one of today’s chief 
problems. It is not something that has a simple solution.”) and Michael Lietdtke, Google 
Also Gets Fooled by Fake Election News, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 15, 2016), 
https://apnews.com/e5d5c46f2ffb4fffa6c39821cf1959c8 [http://perma.cc/W4JF-HQQP] 
(“[Google] is taking steps to punish sites that manufacture falsehoods . . . . [I]t will prevent 
its lucrative digital ads from appearing on sites that ‘misrepresent, misstate, or conceal 
information.’”) with Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (NOV. 12, 2016), 
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10103253901916271 [http://perma.cc/8G7W-AHLX] 
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to provide relief for individuals while adequately deterring the 
creation and dissemination of fake news in the future. 
In every state in the United States, slander, libel, or defamation 
laws protect individuals’ reputations from destruction by false 
statements.22 Why then, do the subjects of fake news stories who 
suffer reputational and—in some cases—actual harm, not sue under 
state defamation law?23 After all, using the “Pizzagate” story as an 
example, it was published with no concern for the accuracy of the 
statements made within it, and it substantially harmed the restaurant, 
its owner, and the Clintons. Yet neither the Clintons, the store, nor 
the owner ever brought suit against the authors of the story or the 
websites through which it was disseminated. 
Despite the desire to protect the reputations of private citizens, 
much of the case law regarding defamation demonstrates courts’ 
hesitancy in making it easier for plaintiffs to recover in defamation 
lawsuits.24 While it may at first seem to be unproblematic to attack 
 
(telling Facebook users that he does not believe fake news stories affected the 2016 
presidential election results, and that the company would cautiously explore ways to flag 
false news stories). 
 22. See, e.g., Andrews v. Elliot, 109 N.C. App. 271, 274, 426 S.E.2d 430, 432 (1993) 
(classifying “statements which are susceptible of but one meaning . . . and that tend to 
‘disgrace and degrade the party or hold him up to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule’” as 
defamatory per se (quoting Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 786, 195 S.E. 55, 
60 (1938))); Murray v. Holnam, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 743, 748 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001) (holding 
that “[t]he elements of defamation include: (1) a false and defamatory statement 
concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault on the part 
of the publisher; and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm 
or the existence of special harm caused by the publication”); Sullivan v. Baptist Mem’l 
Hosp., 995 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tenn. 1999) (holding that to prevail on a defamation claim, 
“the plaintiff must establish that: (1) a party published a statement; (2) with knowledge 
that the statement is false and defaming to the other; or (3) with reckless disregard for the 
truth of the statement or with negligence in failing to ascertain the truth of the 
statement”). 
 23. In an interview with NPR, Derigan Silver, a professor of media, First Amendment 
and Internet law at the University of Denver, discussed the reasons why it is not 
particularly feasible to bring defamation claims in response to fake news articles. What 
Legal Recourse do Victims of Fake News Stories Have?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 7, 2016, 
7:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/12/07/504723649/what-legal-recourse-do-victims-of-
fake-news-stories-have [http://perma.cc/FUU6-R959]. Primarily, recovering monetary 
damages is unlikely to cure the reputational harm, and recovering those damages may 
come at great financial cost that a plaintiff may not be able to bear. See id. Additionally, it 
is often difficult, if not impossible, to find the party who could be held legally liable for the 
creation of the content in order to initiate an action. See id. 
 24. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300 (1964) (Goldberg, J., 
concurring) (demonstrating the Court’s concern over the “chilling effect . . . on First 
Amendment freedoms” that strict libel laws create); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 772 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (“[T]he New 
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purveyors of fake news articles containing defamatory content, it is 
important to recognize that strengthening defamation law may place 
increased restrictions on publications, thereby impacting the freedom 
of speech guarantee within the First Amendment.25 Expanding laws 
regulating online defamation is likely to have a “chilling effect” on 
freedom of speech. Chilling free speech has been a constant concern 
for courts in libel and defamation cases.26 
This Recent Development discusses why more lawsuits have not 
been filed over fake news stories and lays out potential alternatives to 
how courts handle defamation caused by fake news. The lack of 
litigation is not only due to the difficulty and cost of finding those 
responsible for creating the defamatory content in fake news articles, 
but also to the existing legal framework not sufficiently deterring the 
creation of that type of content. In an effort to temper the rampant 
spread of misinformation that is becoming increasingly pervasive on 
the internet,27 it may be necessary to hold third parties (websites that 
disseminate this misinformation) liable by allowing recovery for 
individuals in the instances in which the fake news stories are also 
defamatory. Courts should use the “notice and takedown” provision 
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”)28 as a 
model for imposing liability on websites that aid in the spread of fake 
news that contains defamatory content.29 Fake news, as defined by 
 
York Times standard was formulated to protect the press from the chilling danger of 
numerous large damages awards.”). 
 25. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 26. See supra note 24; see also Grzelak v. Calumet Publ’g. Co., 543 F.2d 579, 582 (7th 
Cir. 1975) (reasoning that the burden of proving the requisite intent standard for liability 
“is placed upon plaintiffs” in order to “minimize the ‘chilling effect’ that libel suits 
invariably have on the exercise of First Amendment rights”) (quoting Time, Inc. v. 
McLaney, 406 F.2d 565, 566 (5th Cir. 1969)); Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., 366 F. Supp. 
92, 94–95 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (“Frivolous libel suits should be dismissed summarily to avoid 
the ‘chilling effect’ on free speech . . . .”) (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 
487 (1965)). See generally Anna Vamialis, Online Defamation: Confronting Anonymity, 21 
INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 31 (2012) (discussing the conflict between defamation law and 
freedom of speech on the internet, especially when considering anonymous speech). 
 27. See Sapna Maheshwari, How Fake News Goes Viral: A Case Study, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/business/media/how-fake-news-
spreads.html [https://perma.cc/TY2Q-FJAJ]. 
 28. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2012). 
 29. Numerous legal scholars, law students, and even federal judges have proposed 
that the notice-and-takedown scheme of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DCMA”) be used as a model by which to alter § 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act; however, it continues to be a useful model for the explicit purposes of protecting 
individual rights that are harmed by fake news containing defamatory content. See, e.g., 
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1032 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003) (proposing the notice-and-
takedown provision of the DMCA as a possible solution to the problems created by the 
broad immunity provided in § 230); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting 
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this Recent Development, provides none of the societal benefits often 
provided by traditional news outlets,30 and that is why fake news in 
particular needs to be quelled.  
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I defines fake news as 
referenced in this Recent Development. Part II briefly examines the 
background of defamation law in the United States, including N.Y. 
Times Co. v. Sullivan,31 and section 509 of the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996, codified as 47 U.S.C. §	230 (“§	230”).32 Part III 
analyzes the balance struck between the First Amendment rights that 
courts have historically tended to favor in the context of defamation 
lawsuits and three different potential forms of liability for websites 
that allow fake news stories to remain on their forums. This first form 
of liability for online publishers is the current one that is regulated by 
§	230. The second potential liability standard is publisher liability, in 
which websites would be liable for anything that they put or allow to 
be put on their site. The third system is distributor liability, which 
would allow for websites to avoid liability for disseminating fake news 
stories if they receive notice of the stories’ defamatory nature and 
remove them from the site within a designated time frame. Finally, 
Part IV argues that the third option, distributor liability, strikes the 
right balance between freedom of speech and the protection of an 
individual’s right to recover for unlawful harm to her reputation. 
 
Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L. REV. 335, 343 (2005) (proposing “that Congress scale back 
§ 230’s absolute immunity for ISPs by reformulating online intermediary law to harmonize 
elements from the common law of distributor liability, the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act’s (DMCA) notice-and-takedown procedure, and the European Union’s E-Commerce 
Directive.”); Julie Hsia, Note, Twitter Trouble: The Communications Decency Act in 
Inaction, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 399, 441 (2017) (recommending that the “notice and 
takedown” provision of the DMCA be used in the United States to combat unlawful 
material published on Twitter); Colleen M. Koch, Comment, To Catch a Catfish: A 
Statutory Solution for Victims of Online Impersonation, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 233, 238–39 
(2017) (suggesting amending § 230 to allow social networking sites to be found liable for 
harmful online impersonation, or “catfishing,” by using a similar “notice and takedown” 
provision to the one in the DMCA); Cecilia Ziniti, Note, The Optimal Liability System for 
Online Service Providers: How Zeran v. America Online Got it Right and Web 2.0 Proves 
It, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 583, 603 (2008) (“A formal notice-based system [akin to that 
in the DMCA] . . . would give injured parties a mechanism to request removal of offending 
content and service providers an incentive to take that content down—an incentive they 
argue that § 230 fails to provide.”). 
 30. See infra text accompanying notes 58–62. 
 31. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 32. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
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I. FAKE NEWS DEFINED 
The term “fake news” has recently been commandeered by a 
number of public figures and media outlets to convey displeasure 
over what is reported within a news report;33 however, it is important 
to make key definitional distinctions before proposing how the legal 
community should make adjustments to that phenomenon. For the 
purposes of this Recent Development, “fake news” covers only 
inaccurate articles published online “in the guise of a genuine news 
story” that are created without any concern as to their truth or 
falsity.34 
Publications in traditional media formats are not subject to any 
of the protections afforded to online publications; the statutory 
immunities that exist for online publishers of information make it 
harder for individuals whose reputations are illegally harmed to 
recover damages from those information publishers.35 The thrust of 
the solution that would allow plaintiffs to recover from online 
publishers, thereby curtailing fake news, centers around changing 
§	230, which provides immunity for websites against tort claims as 
long as the domain owner does not contribute to or edit the allegedly 
tortious content appearing on the site.36 The focus on fake news 
stories published on the internet stems in part from the fact that many 
online sources that distribute fake news stories do not set or enforce 
the strict internal standards to which many paper publications hold 
their employees.37 These different standards that print and online 
 
 33. See Stephen Collinson, An Amazing Moment in History: Trump’s Press 
Conference, CNN (Feb. 16, 2017, 5:13 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/16/politics
/donald-trump-press-conference-amazing-day-in-history/index.html [https://perma.cc
/C3JJ-FKHF] (reporting on President Trump’s press conference in which he called reports 
about his alleged personal connections with Russia “fake news”); see also Alana 
Abramson, White House Blasts ‘Fake News,’ Won’t Answer Questions on Jared Kushner, 
TIME (May, 30, 2017), http://time.com/4798343/sean-spicer-fake-news-jared-kushner/ 
[http://perma.cc/Y6R3-G6GM] (relaying then-Press Secretary Sean Spicer’s description of 
President Trump’s frustration with certain negative stories, which he called “fake news”); 
Callum Borchers, ‘Fake News’ Has Now Lost All Meaning, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/09/fake-news-has-now-lost-all-
meaning/?utm_term=.c91dadfbe936 [https://perma.cc/58Y8-ANKD] (“[C]onservatives—led 
by President Trump—have hijacked the term [“fake news”] and sought to redefine it as, 
basically, any reporting they don’t like.”). 
 34. See Anthony J. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy: The Toxic Mix of Fake News, 
Hyperpolarization, and Partisan Election Administration, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 57, 66 (2017). 
 35. See infra Section III.A. 
 36. See 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
 37. Many online sources, particularly ones that disseminate fake news stories, do not 
have internal guidelines by which their employees or reporters must abide. But cf. N.Y. 
TIMES, ETHICAL JOURNALISM: A HANDBOOK OF VALUES AND PRACTICES FOR THE 
96 N.C. L. REV. 270 (2017) 
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publications are held to are important for reinforcing societal norms 
outside the legal system. 
Additionally, fake news stories are sometimes written or 
produced by anonymous authors.38 While anonymous speech 
encourages people to express opinions that they would ordinarily 
have kept to themselves,39 it should not prohibit those harmed by a 
reckless misstatement, or worse by intentionally false stories, from 
receiving a remedy for harm to their reputation. As the Fourth 
Circuit has asserted, “[§] 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the 
robust nature of internet communication and, accordingly, to keep 
government interference in the medium to a minimum.”40 While this 
was and remains a worthy goal, §	230 has expanded beyond the 
purpose for which it was created—robust speech—and has devolved 
into an overprotective mechanism for those who break the law on the 
internet.41 
This Recent Development does not seek to propose remedies for 
defamatory publications by traditional news outlets like newspapers, 
magazines, television, or radio stations. In addition to these news 
outlets not being granted statutory immunity to defamation like their 
online-only counterparts,42 they also have notable internal 
 
NEWS AND EDITORIAL DEPARTMENTS 7 (Sept. 2004), www.nytco.com/wp-content/uploads
/NYT_Ethical_Journalism_0904-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/DMM4-N4T9] (“The Times treats 
its readers as fairly and openly as possible. In print and online, we tell our readers the 
complete, unvarnished truth as best we can learn it. It is our policy to correct our errors, 
large and small, as soon as we become aware of them.”); The Washington Post Standards 
and Ethics, ASNE http://asne.org/content.asp?contentid=335 [https://perma.cc/SC74-
MCTH] (“The newspaper shall tell ALL the truth so far as it can learn it, concerning the 
important affairs of America and the world.”). Part of the reason for the rise in fake news 
is the immense number of sources that distribute or claim to distribute legitimate news. 
See Gaughan, supra note 34, at 65–66. The decline in the need for the traditional 
“gatekeepers” of national news has increased the acceptability of other sources, 
sometimes to the detriment of truth. See id. 
 38. See Vamialis, supra note 26, at 32. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 41. For examples of further legal debate concerning the overprotective nature of 
§ 230, see supra note 29. 
 42. See, e.g., Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967) (“Newspapers, 
magazines, and broadcasting companies . . . inflict damage in the course of performing a 
service highly useful to the public . . . and injured persons should not be relegated to 
remedies which make collection of their claims difficult or impossible unless strong policy 
considerations demand.”) (quoting Buckley v. N.Y. Post Corp. 373 F.2d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 
1967)); id. at 150 (“The publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the 
application of general laws.”) (quoting Associated Press v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 301 
U.S. 103, 132–33 (1937)); Associated Press, Raleigh News & Observer Loses Libel Lawsuit 
from SBI Agent, TIMES-NEWS (Oct. 19, 2016, 2:12 PM), http://www.thetimesnews.com
/news/20161019/raleigh-news--observer-loses-libel-lawsuit-from-sbi-agent [https://perma.cc
96 N.C. L. REV. 270 (2017) 
278 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
mechanisms to avoid publishing falsehoods.43 These traditional 
outlets are also liable for defamation committed by their employees 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior.44 
Additionally, editorial sections of traditional media outlets like 
newspapers do not try to deceive readers into believing contentions 
within them are factual, but rather are “traditional forum[s] for 
debate, where intemperate and highly biased opinions are frequently 
presented and .	.	. often times should not be taken at face value.”45 
This notion of personal opinion not being subject to defamation 
claims has extended to personal social media accounts. For example, 
one federal court deemed a tweet incapable of defamatory meaning 
because the discussion on Twitter was filled with exaggerations, and 
the tweet in question was clearly a personal opinion.46 In another 
case, a state court in New York dismissed a defamation claim against 
President Donald Trump and members of his campaign staff because 
the plaintiff could not show that the allegedly defamatory statements 
made via social media posts, during his campaign, rose to anything 
more than personal opinion.47 Thus, social media posts from the 
personal accounts of named private individuals are akin to newspaper 
editorial sections—not likely to be considered capable of defamatory 
meaning—and are not considered fake news within this Recent 
Development. The key distinction between personal opinion or 
editorial pages on websites and fake news is that in context, the 
former is generally not perceived as a genuine news story. 
 
/ZT5W-728Y] (reporting on a jury finding a North Carolina newspaper liable for libel 
after publishing statements from firearms experts questioning a SBI agent’s ballistics 
analysis, as well as their suspicions that she helped falsify evidence to help prosecutors win 
a murder conviction in 2006). 
 43. See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, supra note 37, at 7. (“The Times treats its readers as fairly 
and openly as possible. In print and online, we tell our readers the complete, unvarnished 
truth as best we can learn it. It is our policy to correct our errors, large and small, as soon 
as we become aware of them.”). 
 44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An 
employer is subject to liability for torts committed by employees while acting within the 
scope of their employment.”). 
 45. Keohane v. Stewart, 882 P.2d 1293, 1301 (Colo. 1994). 
 46. See Feld v. Conway, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2014) (holding the tweet “Mara 
Feld . . . is fucking crazy,” when viewed in the context of the entire Twitter feed, could not 
reasonably be anything other than opinion and was therefore constitutionally privileged). 
 47. Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S. 3d 330, 339–40 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017) (explaining that 
New York courts are less likely to find defamation in statements made on social media 
than on other platforms because those online forums welcome a broad array of emotional 
and imprecise communication). 
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Finally, historically, pieces or remarks that are clearly opinion,48 
parody,49 or hyperbole50 are constitutionally privileged and cannot be 
subject to a truth or falsity investigation by the courts; therefore, 
these categories of articles are not the subject of discussion in this 
Recent Development. The affirmative defense that fake news is 
parody or hyperbole may be raised in a defamation case concerning 
fake news, but the Supreme Court has established limits on what it 
will accept as defenses to defamation law.51 
While determining the intent of the makers of fake news is not 
critical to this Recent Development, it is interesting to note that for 
the most part, the writers of the most relevant fake news stories are 
not politically or ideologically motivated, but rather, are financially 
motivated.52 For example, an investigation by Craig Silverman, who 
reported extensively on fake news for BuzzFeed, discovered that 
young people in rural Macedonia would investigate topics doing well 
on Facebook (usually extreme right-wing material), republish the 
story with a new sensationalized headline on their websites, and share 
it on Facebook.53 Every click from Facebook to the false news story 
generated a significant amount of advertising revenue for the 
websites, and the Macedonian teens received more ad revenue for 
U.S.-based Facebook users than users from any other country.54 Even 
though the fake news articles were politically charged, the writers 
often did not share those radical views.55 For those writers, fake news 
articles were simply a way to make money.56 This particular type of 
speech can cause significant reputational harm to individuals, and 
 
 48. Keohane, 882 P.2d at 1293. 
 49. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 46–47 (1988) (holding that a parody 
of Jerry Falwell was not actionable because parodies are protected speech). 
 50. Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13 (1970) (holding that 
although the defendant newspaper quoted a third party declaring the plaintiff’s actions 
were “blackmail” during a contentious public meeting, it was clearly not imputing that the 
plaintiff committed the crime of blackmail; therefore, the statement was a hyperbole and 
the newspaper article quoting the statement was not actionable under defamation law). 
 51. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 22 (1990) (recognizing that 
“[s]ociety has a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon 
reputation” in a case where a gym teacher was accused of “perjury” in a newspaper article 
and reversing dismissal of the claim) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966)). 
 52. Fake News Expert, supra note 17 (discussing some of the fake news stories on the 
2016 presidential election). 
 53. Craig Silverman & Lawrence Alexander, How Teens in the Balkans Are Duping 
Trump Supporters with Fake News, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 3, 2016, 7:02 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/how-macedonia-became-a-global-hub-for-pro-trump
-misinfo?utm_term=.nd4JvPje9#.mwNLpgEOJ [https://perma.cc/JBU6-UF98]. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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there should be little to no interest in protecting it because it is not in 
line with any of the important values that United States courts seek to 
protect under the First Amendment.57 
Therefore, this Recent Development will focus solely on stories 
posted on the internet, not including personally constructed social 
media posts. A claim from a prospective defendant that the piece was 
opinion, and thus not subject to the same level of scrutiny as 
publications in other areas, is not problematic because courts will be 
able to deal with those claims as they would in any other defamation 
claim. To reiterate, the term “fake news” within this Recent 
Development refers to inaccurate stories published online “in the 
guise of a genuine news story” without regard for their truth or 
falsity.58 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF DEFAMATION LAW AND ITS 
APPLICATION ON THE INTERNET 
A. Defamation Law 
The seminal case in American defamation doctrine is N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan.59 The Court concluded that in the interest of 
promoting free speech and avoiding a chilling effect on the expansive 
libel law creates, some false speech should be protected.60 The 
Sullivan court held that defamation requires a showing of “actual 
malice” in cases where the allegedly defamatory content concerns a 
public official’s official conduct.61 The Court decided to add a fault 
element requiring the plaintiff prove the defendant either knew that 
the claim was false or made the statement with reckless disregard for 
its accuracy.62 This standard, the Court believed, would promote 
“[d]ebate on public issues [that is] uninhibited, robust, and wide open, 
and that it well may include vehement, caustic, and sometimes 
 
 57. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (asserting certain 
categories of speech, including libelous statements, “are of such slight social value as a step 
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality”); see also infra Section II.A (explaining the Court’s 
rationale in the seminal defamation case, N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), 
when it held the interests of a free press outweighed the individual interests of a person’s 
reputation). 
 58. See Gaughan, supra note 34, at 66. 
 59. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 60. Id.at 298–99 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. at 280 (majority opinion). 
 62. Id.; see also Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666, 667 
(1996) (holding that ill will or profit motive is not enough, by itself, to meet the actual 
malice standard). 
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unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”63 
After this decision, defamation of public officials required several 
elements: (1) a false statement; (2) capable of defamatory meaning; 
(3) of and concerning the plaintiff; (4) to a third-party; (5) made with 
actual malice; (6) and that the statement was not privileged in any 
way.64 
Sullivan is most relevant when the plaintiff in a defamation claim 
is a public figure;65 however, the fault standard varies depending on 
the type of plaintiff and the type of damages the plaintiff is seeking.66 
Later Supreme Court cases identify the fault standards for different 
types of plaintiffs and define who falls under the various plaintiff 
distinctions.67 
First, a public official is someone who is “among the hierarchy of 
government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, 
substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of 
government affairs.”68 Second, a plaintiff may be classified as a public 
figure, and subclassified as either a general or limited purpose public 
figure. A general purpose public figure is one who is generally known 
and famous enough to garner attention from the public.69 Limited 
purpose public figures are those who have “thrust themselves to the 
forefront of a particular public controvers[y] in order to influence the 
resolution of the issue[] involved. [They] invite attention and 
 
 63. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. 
 64. See id. at 256–84. 
 65. Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc., 491 U.S. at 666 (stating “there is no question that 
public figure libel cases are controlled by the New York Times standard” of actual malice). 
 66. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (holding that 
private citizens seeking to recover actual damages for reputational damage, even if the 
article subject matter is of public concern, do not have to prove actual malice). 
 67. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 466 (1976) (holding a private citizen 
embroiled in a highly-publicized divorce was not a “public figure,” and she could prevail 
on a libel claim without proving the defendant publication acted in actual malice); Long v. 
Cooper, 848 F.2d 1202, 1204–06 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that a corporation and its 
president were not limited purpose public figures because neither injected themselves into 
or publicly addressed the newsworthy controversy over which the defamatory statements 
were made). 
 68. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). 
 69. See Time, Inc., 424 U.S. at 486 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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comment.”70 Finally, a private figure is anyone who does not fall into 
one of the above three categories.71 
The table below shows how the required minimum fault 
standards vary between class of plaintiff and within classes of 
plaintiffs depending on whether the comment is on a matter of public 
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Where actual malice is not required, states are free to implement 
whatever fault standard they deem appropriate. However, when a 
publication issues a false statement about a public figure in a matter 
of public concern, in order for the subject to recover damages, the 
false statement must have been made with actual malice.73 Similarly, 
for a private figure to recover punitive damages when the false 
statement was made regarding her involvement in a matter of public 
concern, she must also prove actual malice.74 
 
 70. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345; see also Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 
1292 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“[A] person has become a public figure for limited purposes if he is 
attempting to have, or realistically can be expected to have, a major impact on the 
resolution of a specific public dispute that has foreseeable and substantial ramifications for 
persons beyond its immediate participants.”). 
 71. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344–45 (describing the various reasons for providing greater 
protections to private plaintiffs in defamation actions, and distinguishing those private 
plaintiffs by describing what constitutes a public figure). 
 72. See supra notes 59–71 and accompanying text. Special thanks to Professor Mary-
Rose Papandrea for providing the figure in her Media Law class. 
 73. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666 (1989). 
 74. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 367. 
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Recovery for a prospective plaintiff thus hinges on the category 
of plaintiff in which a court places the person, as well as the subject of 
the story and the type of damages a plaintiff is seeking. However, it is 
unlikely that fake news stories that receive substantial amounts of 
attention would focus on plaintiffs who fall outside of the public 
official or public figure category, and even less likely that the story 
would not be a matter of public concern. With the current state of 
defamation law now enunciated, this Recent Development moves to 
defamation law’s application to the internet. 
B. Intermediary Liability for Traditional News Outlets under 
Common Law. 
Traditionally, media outlets could be held to three different 
standards of liability depending on the type of outlet and how it 
disseminated information. The first is publisher liability, the scenario 
put forth in N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, in which the news outlet may 
be held liable for anything it prints, regardless of whether or not the 
news outlet or its staff actually created the content.75 The second is 
distributor liability, which applies to “one who only delivers or 
transmits defamatory matter published by a third person .	.	. if, he 
knows or has reason to know of its defamatory character.”76 
“Generally, a distributor, such as a newsstand, bookstore, or library, 
has no duty to examine, for defamatory content, the various 
publications being offered.”77 The last traditional form of liability is 
conduit liability, where parties are subject to liability for transmitting 
defamatory material if they “participate” in production of the 
material.78 
C. Section	230 Immunity for Websites.  
Thanks to the existence of §	230, websites that disseminate 
information are held to a different standard than their traditional 
print media counterparts.79 This statute grants websites immunity to 
defamation claims by stating that “[n]o provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
 
 75. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 262 (1964) (concerning an allegedly 
libelous advertisement written and paid for by a civil rights organization, but published in 
The New York Times). 
 76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 77. William E. Buelow III, Re-Establishing Distributor Liability on the Internet: 
Recognizing the Applicability of Traditional Defamation Law to Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 313, 321 (2013). 
 78. See In re Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants, 931 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D. Ariz. 1996). 
 79. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
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speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”80 As long as the interactive computer service is not the 
information content provider or “any person or entity that is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of 
information provided through the internet or any other interactive 
computer service,” it cannot be held liable for defamation.81 
Practically, this means that as long as a website does not create 
the content that it displays, then it is not liable for whatever 
information is provided on that website. For example, in Zeran v. 
American Online, Inc.,82 Zeran sued American Online, Inc. (“AOL”) 
for failing to remove hoax advertisements posted by an anonymous 
third party on an AOL bulletin board.83 The advertisement featured 
shirts with inappropriate slogans about the Oklahoma City bombing 
and included Zeran’s phone number for inquiries.84 As a result, Zeran 
received angry calls and death threats.85 Zeran notified AOL, but 
AOL did not remove it from the website.86 Even though AOL 
received notice of the harmful material, the computer service 
provider was immune from liability because a third party and not 
AOL created the defamatory material.87 
In enacting the Communications Decency Act, Congress decided 
that it was in the best interest of the country to offer a forum “for true 
diversity of political discourse, [and] unique opportunities for cultural 
development”88 by “promot[ing] the continued development of the 
Internet.”89 Zeran demonstrates that Congress created a tremendous 
barrier to recovery for defamation when it passed §	230. Despite the 
admirable intentions of Congress, it is unlikely that anyone 
anticipated the breadth and impact that the internet would have 
twenty years later. The statute, as it stands, does not provide 
adequate protections for defamed individuals and protects far more 
false, and oftentimes, illegal speech than necessary to ensure a robust 
freedom of speech. 
 
 80. § 230(c)(1). 
 81. § 230(f)(3). Websites cannot escape liability for publishing material that violates 
federal criminal law, communications privacy law, and intellectual property law. 
§ 230(e)(1), (2), (4). 
 82. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 83. Id. at 328. 
 84. Id. at 329. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 329, 331. 
 87. Id. at 328–29. 
 88. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (2012). 
 89. § 230(b)(1). 
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III. STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE: DIFFERENT FORMS OF 
LIABILITY FOR WEBSITES AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
In reviewing who may be liable for defamation for fake news 
published on the internet, it is important to note why targeting 
websites may be the most effective method in both obtaining 
remedies for the person harmed as well as deterring the dissemination 
of fake news. While attempting to hold the author of fake news liable 
is always a viable remedy,90 it is not necessarily practical. First, many 
authors of fake news publications are anonymous,91 and second, even 
if one could discover the author’s identity, fake news is sometimes 
developed in other countries by those without sufficient resources to 
provide an adequate remedy.92 And therein lies part of the issue. 
Since it is not financially reasonable to file a claim against an 
individual who is neither in an American court’s jurisdiction nor 
likely to be able to provide any financial compensation in a lawsuit, 
why waste the time and money suing? Holding websites rather than 
individual users accountable would better enable financial recovery 
and would also place an onus on websites to be more cognizant of 
how people are using their platform. 
Below, the three different types of intermediary liability are 
analyzed in the context of their application to websites and fake news. 
The first type is the one currently in place under §	230, which 
promotes a robust free flow of information and is very protective of 
the freedom of speech. The second type of liability, publishers 
liability, would treat websites like traditional media outlets. This 
system strikes a balance that favors protecting individual liberties 
over the freedom of speech. Finally, this Recent Development 
introduces distributor liability, which maintains immunity for websites 
who do not have knowledge nor should have had knowledge about 
defamatory material on the site, and this Recent Development 
explains the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s notice and takedown 
provision.93 
 
A. Liability for Websites Under §	230. 
As previously discussed, if a website did not create the content of 
a fake news story, it is not subject to liability as an author or 
 
 90. See § 230(e)(3). 
 91. See supra text accompanying notes 38–39. 
 92. See supra text accompanying notes 53–56 (explaining the influx of fakes news 
stories on the U.S. presidential election generated by teens in a poor, rural town in 
Macedonia). 
 93. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
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publisher.94 As such, it is unlikely that continuing to treat fake news in 
this way will provide adequate recourse for plaintiffs or effectively 
deter potential fake news authors. However, it is possible that courts 
could get creative with what actually constitutes an “information 
content provider”95 and hold that websites are not so liberally granted 
§	230 immunity. Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roomates.com, LLC96 provides an example of the type of protections 
that courts have the power to implement while keeping §	230 in place. 
In that case, Roommates.com was sued for violations of the Fair 
Housing Act (“FHA”)97 because the website allowed users to 
describe their ideal roommate in comment boxes, and also required 
users answer questions about the user’s roommate preferences 
through drop-down menus.98 Specifically, users were required to 
disclose their own and their preferences for their roommate’s sex, 
sexual orientation, and whether they would bring children.99 The 
district court held §	230 granted Roommates.com immunity from all 
claims, but the Ninth Circuit disagreed.100 The Ninth Circuit 
remanded the case to the district court to determine if 
Roommates.com was liable for violation of the FHA for promoting 
discrimination in housing situations.101 While the comments section 
retained immunity under §	230,102 the court found that by requiring 
users to disclose preferences via the drop-down menus, the website 
utilized a “discriminatory filtering process” and “designed its search 
and email systems to limit the listings available to subscribers based 
on sex, sexual orientation, and presence of children.”103 Section 230 
was previously understood to shield websites from potential liability 
under laws implicating publishers or content creators, so long as the 
website did not create the content.104 The FHA claims against 
Roomates.com were not defamation claims but would presumably fall 
under the §	230 umbrella because the allegedly discriminatory 
roommate and housing preferences were generated by third-party 
 
 94. See supra Section II.C. 
 95. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
 96. 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 97. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012) (prohibiting housing intermediaries from discriminatory 
practices against housing applicants based on, among other things, sex and familial status). 
 98. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1161–62. 
 99. Id. at 1169. 
 100. Id. at 1175. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1169. 
 104. Id. at 1173–74. 
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users.105 The dissent voiced concerned with the majority’s 
determination, stating it seems arbitrary in light of the statute and is 
likely to chill free speech by forcing websites to become “Net 
Nannies” that filter a substantial amount of content.106 
The Communications Decency Act, despite the contentions of 
the dissent in Roommates.com, still provides ample protection for 
websites with user-generated content published on the site; however, 
the majority opinion left the door cracked a bit for expansion as to 
what the term “information content provider” includes. There are 
cases in which courts have refused to dispose of §	230 immunity in 
defamation cases because they did not find that the websites created 
the content.107 However, it is possible that courts could become more 
plaintiff-friendly in deciding the fact-specific question of what 
constitutes an information content provider.108 
While there is still potential for defamation liability for fake news 
under the current system of website liability, the current liability 
scheme ultimately provides the vast and encompassing protection of 
the freedom of speech contemplated by Justice Brennan in N.Y. 
Times Co. v. Sullivan and by Congress in its enactment of §	230. 
Simply providing a space for users to post links and comments on a 
social media website or in the comment section on a website is 
unlikely to ever be an exception to §	230, as was seen in 
Roommates.com, and that is one key method by which fake news is 
spread.109 The individual rights of those harmed by the spread of fake 
news via intermediary websites are strongly outweighed by 
protections that Congress gave websites with §	230. However, moving 
forward, is this type of speech worth protecting? The Sullivan Court 
wanted to grant more leeway for false speech in order to avoid stifling 
 
 105. Id. at 1163. 
 106. See id. at 1187–88 (McKeown, J., dissenting). 
 107. See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 417 (6th Cir. 
2014) (holding that the website, www.TheDirty.com, allowed unlawful material to be 
posted on the website, but protected its § 230 immunity because the publisher did not 
“materially contribute to the tortious content”); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. 
Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d 250, 260 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that the plaintiff failed to 
show that Consumeraffairs.com was an information content provider for any of the 
allegedly libelous posts on a consumer review website concerning plaintiff’s car 
dealership). 
 108. See, e.g., FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1201 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that a website lost § 230 immunity because it “solicited requests for confidential 
information [that it did not create] protected by law, paid researchers to find it, knew that 
the researchers were likely to use improper methods, and charged customers who wished 
the information to be disclosed”). 
 109. See Maheshwari, supra note 27. 
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public discussion,110 but fake news is entirely false speech used to 
obliterate public discussion and potentially destroy individuals’ 
reputations. 
B. Publishers Liability for Websites 
While §	230 provides too much protection for websites, 
publishers liability goes too far in the other direction in protecting 
individual rights at the expense of free speech. Traditionally, without 
the protections granted by §	230, a publisher could be held liable for 
anything published within its platform, regardless of whether or not 
the publisher created the content.111 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan 
provides an illustrative example of publishers liability. The New York 
Times was sued for defamation for content appearing in an “editorial 
advertisement,” despite the fact that the newspaper staff did not 
create any of the content within the advertisement.112 There was no 
debate that the newspaper could be held liable for defamation as the 
intermediary as a matter of law, but only whether they should be held 
liable based on the facts. 
Should this type of liability be extended to the internet and 
replace §	230, it would most certainly over-correct for the holes 
currently in existence. Hyperbolic and opinionated comments would 
still not impute liability on the website, as editorial sections do not 
convey liability in newspapers;113 however, it is unlikely that websites 
would be willing to risk liability by providing open forums for third-
party visitors. Under this system of liability, websites would be so 
fearful of litigation that it would not be fiscally responsible to 
maintain the same kind of free flow of information imagined by 
Congress when it passed §	230.114 In fact, the concerns of Judge 
McKeown in his dissent in Roommates.com would become very real 
 
 110. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964). 
 111. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, 
at *4–5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute, Communications Decency Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. 104–104, § 509(c)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 137–39 as recognized in Shiamili v. Real 
Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (N.Y. 2011) (dismissing a motion for 
summary judgment by a computer network provider in a libel lawsuit because the provider 
was a “publisher” of third-party statements on its bulletin board). In both Zeran and in 
Roommates.com, the courts stated that Congress sought to prevent the result in Stratton 
Oakmont when it enacted § 230. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1163; Zeran v. Am. 
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 112. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 255. 
 113. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
 114. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4) (2012) (“The Internet and other interactive computer 
services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government 
regulation.”). 
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under the context of a publisher liability system for websites: “the 
burden of filtering content would be unfathomable,”115 websites 
would “have no choice but to severely limit its use,” and “[s]heer 
economics would dictate that vast quantities of valuable information 
be eliminated from websites.”116 Clearly, this scheme would present 
too much of the “chilling effect” that Justice Goldberg was concerned 
about in Sullivan.117 Publishers liability is much more reasonable for 
traditional media publications because there is only so much space in 
a newspaper or magazine. The publisher can control what goes in and 
monitor it closely. However, interactive computer services that 
encourage open and robust discussion would either have to monitor 
potentially vast numbers of posts and contributions, or drastically 
limit availability of open forums. The former is unworkable as a 
matter of practicality for websites, and the latter flies in the face of 
exactly what the Constitution and judicial and legislative precedent 
have encouraged. While holding purveyors of fake news liable is 
important, it cannot and should not be done to this extent at the 
expense of the First Amendment. 
C. Distributor Liability and the “Notice and Takedown” Provision of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
Under common law, distributor liability may be incurred by a 
person who transfers the material from the author to the consumer.118 
These transfers could encompass “selling, renting, giving or otherwise 
transferring or circulating a book, paper, magazine, document or 
phonograph record containing defamation published by a third 
person.”119 This is knowledge-based liability, so if a distributor knows 
or should have known about defamatory material in the publication 
they are disseminating, then they have the same potential liability as 
the publisher.120 This system is the one that strikes the best balance 
between individual rights and freedom of speech while still being able 
to combat fake news. 
If websites are considered by law to be distributors of 
information when they are simply the medium through which people 
 
 115. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1188 (McKweon, J., dissenting). 
 116. Id. (quoting Brief for News Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Roomates.com at 22, Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 
2010) (Nos. 04-56916, 04-57173)). 
 117. 376 U.S. at 300 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 118. Buelow, supra note 76, at 320–21. 
 119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 120. Id. § 581(1). 
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communicate, then fake news might be effectively combated while 
still preserving a rich communal debate. However, if websites had to 
investigate everything written on the site, it is unlikely they would 
meet the knowledge requirement of distributor liability, and would be 
able to surreptitiously claim sheer volume as a reason that they did 
not spot and remove defamatory material. The DMCA provides an 
analogous law from which one could build a system that is fair to the 
websites, the subjects of defamatory fake news, and to the nation’s 
interest in having a robust freedom of speech right. 
The rise of the internet has presented new problems to copyright 
law, just as it has for defamation law. In order to establish copyright 
infringement, “two elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid 
copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that 
are original.”121 Congress enacted the DMCA in 1998 “in an effort to 
adapt U.S. copyright law to the challenges posed by digital 
technologies and the online environment.”122 
The prescient point of the DMCA is the notice and takedown 
provision.123 In order for a website to avoid liability for copyright 
infringement, a service provider must demonstrate “good faith 
disabling of access to, or removal of, material or activity claimed to be 
infringing or based on facts or circumstances from which infringing 
activity is apparent, regardless of whether the material or activity is 
ultimately determined to be infringing.”124 If the website is notified of 
potential copyright infringement, it will not be held liable if it takes 
the allegedly infringing work down.125 
IV. THE MERITS OF USING THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT 
ACT AS A GUIDEPOST IN COMBATTING FAKE NEWS ONLINE  
The above described formula combining traditional distributor 
liability and the “notice and takedown” scheme of the DMCA should 
be applied to websites and fake news.126 As long as websites keep a 
 
 121. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). For additional 
information on what may be registered as a copyright and the procedures for registering a 
copyright, see generally Copyright Basics, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. (2012), 
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ01.pdf#page=7 [https://perma.cc/6HV9-E25E]. 
 122. DAVID KOHLER ET AL., MEDIA AND THE LAW 621 (2d ed. 2014). 
 123. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
 124. § 512(g)(1). 
 125. See id. 
 126. This suggestion is not novel, and the DMCA provides a useful model by which 
scholars have suggested revising § 230. See Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Losing Their 
License to Libel: Revisiting § 230 Immunity, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1505, 1559 (2015) 
(suggesting revising § 230 to model the notice-and-takedown provisions of the DMCA to 
allow for more recoveries from Internet intermediaries and third-party users in 
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record of their alerts and monitor exceedingly suspicious articles that 
are not linked to a verifiable source, then they should only be liable 
for defamatory publications on their sites if they should have known 
or did know about the material. Not only does this system allow for 
recovery by harmed individuals, but it also puts the onus on the public 
to report fake news to the individuals about which it is posted. While 
this “notice and takedown” plan will certainly curb some public 
discourse, it would not be as dramatic of a change as implementing 
publisher liability, and it would give substantially more protection to 
individuals who have been defamed. Additionally, the discourse 
sought to be curtailed by this suggestion is completely false and is 
intended to misinform and mislead the public. This system also allows 
for a temporary takedown to review the material to ensure that it is in 
fact real news. 
While the “notice and takedown” provision of the DMCA 
provides a model by which Congress can modify §	230 to increase 
liability for websites that maintain fake news articles on their forums, 
the model is not a precise fit. The DMCA has certain foundational 
elements that make claims of its violation both less likely to be 
abused and easier to identify. First, claims of a violation of the 
DMCA are made by parties “under penalty of perjury, that the 
complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an 
exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.”127 The statute limits those 
who are properly able to bring the suit and stamps them with the 
responsibility to honestly report a violation.128 Additionally, in 
notifying the website, the complainant must identify “the copyrighted 
work claimed to have been infringed”129 and “information reasonably 
sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material.”130 
It may, admittedly, be difficult to develop a statute that limits 
reporting of potentially defamatory fake news articles to a 
 
defamation claims); Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The 
Case of Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 622–23 (2001) 
(using the notice-and-takedown provision of the DMCA to provide an example that 
illustrates how Congress had previously required online intermediaries to protect “victims’ 
injuries at the hands of third parties”); Stephanie Blumstein, Note, The New Immunity in 
Cyberspace: The Expanded Reach of The Communications Decency Act to the Libelous 
“Re-Poster,” 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH L. 407, 431 (2003) (contending that statutory revisions 
to § 230 should model the notice-and-takedown provisions of the DMCA). 
 127. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi). 
 128. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (asserting that a complainant must provide “[a] statement that 
the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner 
complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law”). 
 129. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii). 
 130. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii). 
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manageable level like the DMCA does. First, if only the person who 
is allegedly suffering reputational harm could file these reports, how 
would that person go about proving to the website that they are the 
subject of the story to a degree that would justify the website using 
time and resources to investigate the allegedly defamatory material? 
Unlike with copyright registration, people might not be comfortable 
providing other personal governmental registration information to 
websites in order to prove their identities; for example, it is unlikely 
an individual would send their social security information to a website 
in order to prove her identity. Next, website owners who are alerted 
of potential copyright violations are provided with the work that is 
copyrighted to allow for an efficient investigation.131 This is not 
possible for website owners who are alerted to stories that are 
allegedly entirely fabricated. The reporting party would essentially be 
tasked with proving a negative, thus imputing substantially more 
investigative responsibility upon the domain owner to determine 
whether a story has a total absence of truth. 
The issues presented do pose problems, but not unworkable 
ones. It is logical that only copyright owners or those authorized to 
act for them are able to report infringement as they are invested with 
an intellectual property interest in the copyright. The simplest, most 
straightforward way to translate this to the fake news context would 
be to require individuals to provide the website with a signed affidavit 
asserting that their reputation is being harmed by a fake news article. 
Ideally, this, and the threat of both civil litigation and perjury charges 
would deter those who may seek to abuse the system. As previously 
discussed, this Recent Development proposes imputing distributor 
liability upon these websites: they may be held liable if they “knew or 
should have known” about the defamatory material.132 This allows for 
more flexibility for websites to manage how they investigate reports 
of fake news. Perhaps having a regulated system for investigation 
could be a condition that would alleviate most of that liability.133 
 
 131. Chris Sprigman & Mark Lemley, Opinion, Why Notice-and-Takedown is a Bit of 
Copyright Law Worth Saving, L.A. TIMES (Jun. 21, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com
/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-sprigman-lemley-notice-and-takedown-dmca-20160621-snap-story.html 
[http://perma.cc/38TZ-WYBU]. 
 132. See supra Section III.C; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 133. This potential solution is analogous to another realm of legal action: derivative 
claims. See Rahbari v. Oros, 732 F. Supp. 2d 367, 382 (2nd Cir. 2010). For a board of 
directors to be liable for breach of fiduciary duties under the lack of oversight theory, a 
plaintiff must show “(a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or 
information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, 
consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from 
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The proposition of altering §	230 is intended to cure the issues 
created by fake news, not on the margins, but on the extremes. 
Another alternative to accomplish this goal may be to allow websites 
to avoid liability if they were negligent in allowing a fake news story 
to remain on the forum, but hold sites liable if the domain owner 
allowed a story to remain with actual malice.134 This standard would 
mean that as long as websites did not avoid investigating reports with 
reckless disregard, they would not be held liable for any defamatory 
content.135 It would mean AOL would likely not be immune from 
liability for leaving the defamatory post about Zeran on its bulletin 
board after Zeran notified the company that he was being harassed,136 
but Roommates.com would possibly not be in violation of the Fair 
Housing Act when it negligently required users to indicate their 
roommate preferences in a drop-down menu.137 In the context of 
attempting to eliminate purely false stories, this may mean doing a 
brief search of sources cited or a quick search for any reputable 
support for the story. With this system—or a system like it—in place, 
reports made based on unhappiness with a story rather than concern 
with its truthfulness could be dealt with quickly, as most stories with 
adequate support could be efficiently supported. Also, not every 
report would require investigation, because once a story is “cleared,” 
any further investigation would be unnecessary, thus helping with the 
potential volume of complaints. 
With the possibility of liability for websites, domain owners are 
less likely to be concerned with providing a forum for speech and 
more likely to be concerned with protecting their wallets; however, 
under a DMCA-like system, they can lean on the public to inform 
them of defamatory material. Additionally, it can also help with the 
notion that once it is on the internet, it cannot be removed. Under 
this system, if someone publishes a fake news story on Facebook and 
it is reported and taken down, but the story is posted on Reddit 
before it could be removed, Reddit would be under obligation to take 
it down once they got notice as well. Memory of the fake news would 
remain, but it would not permeate headlines on sites that people trust, 
and if they did, then the legal system would present an avenue 
 
being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.” Id. (quoting Stone v. 
Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006)). In other words, if a board has an oversight system 
in place, it is very difficult for an action against the board to survive the motion to dismiss 
phase under the lack of oversight theory. 
 134. See supra Part II. 
 135. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). 
 136. See supra notes 82–89 and accompanying text. 
 137. See supra notes 96–106 and accompanying text. 
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through which someone could recover for any reputational harm. The 
political news cycle in particular moves quickly, and it is likely that 
while a story is being investigated by a domain owner it is also being 
shared in multitudes over any number of social media outlets. 
However, if the story is ultimately removed and the links are 
disconnected, the only place to find the text would probably be on 
private individuals’ profiles. Those who rely on individual posts as the 
basis for their beliefs are unlikely to be persuaded by any action taken 
by websites or the legal system.138 While potential damage from fake 
news is likely to remain, this system is proposed in order to minimize 
that damage to the greatest extent possible. The system is by no 
means perfect, but it does strike a reasonable and workable balance 
between protecting the reputational rights of individuals and 
protecting the national interest in having a robust freedom of speech. 
CONCLUSION 
The spread of fake news on the internet poses substantial threats 
to the reputations of parties without any meaningful recourse to 
recover from those responsible for the dissemination of defamatory 
content. While these individual harms are grave and are made 
especially difficult to bear because the motive for creation is either for 
profit or with the intent to defame, the legal system cannot rush to 
create avenues for recovery at the expense of a robust protection of 
free speech. There is no simple answer to how defamation law should 
evolve to deter the creation of fake news and provide recovery for 
those harmed by it, all the while protecting freedom of speech. 
However, the pervasiveness of fake news and the threat of its 
corrosiveness on both discourse and relationships require serious 
thought be given to revising §	230 of the DMCA.139 By implementing 
a notice and takedown requirement similar to that in the DMCA, 
websites will have the opportunity to remove defamatory posts 
without fear of liability, and individuals will be able to receive 
financial restitution from those websites in the event that they do not 
remove fake news. Welch entered Comet Pizza with the intent to 
harm someone, but had the “Pizzagate” story been removed from 
 
 138. See Fake News Expert, supra note 17 (“[W]hen we’re confronted with information 
that contradicts what we think and what we feel, the reaction isn’t to kind of sit back and 
consider it. The reaction is often to double down on our existing beliefs.”). 
 139. Buelow, supra note 77, at 356 (“[T]here is nothing so inherently unique to this 
medium that justifies a wholesale discounting of traditional defamation law . . . . [T]he 
consequences of defamatory statements posted to Cyberspace frequently have 
consequences in the real world.”). 
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Reddit, Infowars or any of the other sites by which it was 
disseminated sooner, he may never have been there. It is worth 
discussing amending §	230 not only because it can provide actual 
relief to those harmed, but also because reform may negate rash and 
outlandish actions by those who seek to do others harm based on 
completely false publications. 
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